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PLATO'S THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
IN REPUBLIC II-IV
"Actions speak louder than words."
(Old saying)
After his long construction of a "city in speech" throughout Books II-IV
of the Republic, Plato finally presents, as his long sought-for definition of
social justice, the enigmatic and ambiguous formula, "each one doing his own."
My main aim in this paper will be to search out the sense that he has esta
blished for that definition: to show how he thinks he has established (by the
time he unveils it) that that unlikely formula is in fact a reasonable defini
tion of social justice, and to analyze what it means (Sections I-III). Once we
are clear about that, I believe, it will also be clear that Plato's theory of
justice has its primary sources in sophistic thinking, and, in particular, in
the contractarian approach to political philosophy. The very suggestion may
well seem bizarre, since Socrates' entire construction is given as a massive
reply precisely to Glaucon's contractarian story early in Republic II, but I
shall argue that Plato's theory is an extended development of and from Sophis
tic contractarian social theory - not a sheer repudiation of it nor an auto
nomous alternative to it (Section IV). One fringe benefit of this reading will
be that it lets us make very clear the force of Plato's distinction between
justice and temperance - a distinction that many interpreters have not been
able to salvage at all, let alone to make clear (Section V).
Before embarking, I must emphasize the restricted nature of my theme.
Much of Plato's theory in Books II-IV was, doubtless, aimed at preparing the
way for, or at making contact with, his subsequent, internalized theory of
personal justice as psychic harmony - the theory that then bears the burden of
his argument that "justice pays." (In Plato's own metaphor, the study of the
"large letters" is undertaken for the sake of getting at the "small letters.")
True as this is, we cannot explain Books II-IV merely by the end result they
aim at achieving. Plato's project in the Republic is rather like someone tun
neling through a mountain by drilling in from both sides at once toward a
meeting place somewhere in the middle: each side does have to know where the
other side is headed, but each must also proceed on its own terms. The theory
of social justice developed in Books II-IV must make sense as a theory of
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social justice - one that might stand alone even if it were not to be pro
jected subsequently onto the "smaller letters."

I shall try to show reason to

believe (from the claims Plato makes in the "discovery passage" and especially
from the discrepancy between the discovering of justice and the discovering of
the other virtues there) that Plato thought his definition of justice had its
ground in the role that it had played throughout the entire construction
undertaken in Republic II-IV. At any rate, my present concern is solely with
the side of Plato's "drilling operation" that sets out his theory of social
justice? its relevance to his theory of psychic justice lies outside the
present paper's limits.
I
Our argument begins where Plato ends, with his "discovery" of the defini
tion for justice at Rep. 427-434. The imagery of that familiar passage is
wonderfully vivid and concrete. Plato urges us to peer at his completed model
city and to search out the site of all the virtues in it? much as if it were
one of those puzzle pictures where we try to find the faces hidden in the
branches of the bushes, we are enjoined to "look" and to try to "find" or
"see" just "where," where "in it," each of the virtues that we seek is seated
or "resides."

The imagery is a most effective expository device - but of

course cannot justify the content of the definitions it is used to bring
forth. (Neither, it seems to me, does Plato claim any such demonstrative
cogency for it; his "method of residues" or the argument by elimination belong
to his machinery for discovering - i.e. uncovering or disclosing - his views,
and not to the grounds for their justification.) For our present purposes,
however, the important fact about Plato's method for disclosing his defini
tions of the virtues is the way in which it breaks down in the key case of
justice. Each of the other three virtues is discovered to reside somewhere
"in" the completed city. Each turns out to "reside" there in importantly dif
ferent ways - some in a specific "part" of the city (428E, 429B, 431E) and
temperance diffused throughout the whole (432A) - but the method works for all
three: all are features of the city that prove "visible" somewhere in its fin
ished form. But not so justice. To be sure, when Plato comes to the case of
justice he continues and even intensifies his metaphor of searching and peer
ing, his urgings to look sharply and not let the prey escape (432B7-C6) and
his mock-somber words about the shadowed darkness of its lurking place (C7-9).
Yet none of this can mask the fact that he does not, in the end, find justice
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to be visible, like the others, in the finished city. Instead, as he abruptly
comes to "realize," it is not at all to be found on the same terms as they
were: it is not something visible only in the finally completed city, but has
been right before them all along, all through the process of constructing the
city, "right from the beginning" (432D7, 433A1).

%

fundamental thesis will be

that this discrepancy between the "finding" of justice and the finding of the
other political virtues is the key to the Republic's doctrine of political
justice.

We shall return in due course to an attempt to explain what lies

behind this "discrepancy" (in Section IV below), but first we need to look at
some details of Plato's exposition in Books II-IV.
When Plato does at last unveil his definition of justice, he gives us the
following:
What we laid down at the start as a general requirement when we were
founding the polis, this, or some form of it, is justice. For we
did lay down, and often stated, if you recall, that every single
individual ought to engage in that single social function for which
his own nature is best suited. (433A1-6)
The principle of justice stated here, in these unlikely terms, in fact
involves several distinguishable components, and all have indeed been
emphasized throughout Plato's earlier account of the city (though, as we shall
see, the commentators tend to notice only a portion of its complex content).
We shall have to distinguish some further aspects of this principle of justice
(see Section III below) but for the present we need mention only three. These
I shall dub (A) the Uniqueness Requirement: that each man should do one and
only one job; (B) the Fittedness Requirement: that that job should be the one
for which each is best naturally suited; and (C) the Service Requirement: that
each individual should contribute through his job to the common good of the
society as a whole.

Most commentators see a reference to the first two in 433A

(citing such passages as 370A-C» 395B-C and 397E), but the third one, too, is
essential, even if, like so much else in Plato's treatment of justice, it is
perhaps so obvious as to escape attention. It is indicated in the very text
of 433A by Plato's reference to the "one job" in question for each man as his
hen...ton peri ten polin: his "one social service in the state" (Shorey), "one
function in the community" (Cornford), or the like. Although it has perhaps
not "oftentimes" been referred to earlier, this general principle of service
to the polis has indeed been a guiding principle throughout the construction.
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It was made forcefully explicit on at least one important occasion, and a
close look at an unnoticed detail of that occasion will help shed light upon
the principles of justice that have in fact been "right before our eyes from
the start." The passage I have in mind is Socrates' well-known reply (at
420B-421C) when Adeimantus complains that no particularly "happy" lot has been
contrived for the Guardians of the polis.

The basic aim of any polis, Socrates

answers, is not the happiness or good of any part within it, but the common
good of the whole. His account of that principle need not concern us now.
Instead it is important to observe the way that Socrates refers to the princi
ple when raising it in his reply: confronted with Adeimantus' "charges" and
asked how he will "defend" himself (420B1; cf. 419A2), he answers that "by
following the same path we shall, I think, find what must be said."

But by

what right does he refer to it as "the same path"? Although some commentators
have remarked on the poetic word that Plato uses here for "path," I know of
none who have dealt with his reference to the path in question as "the same."
Yet it must be the "same" one, obviously enough, as they have been following
up to that point - following right from the start. Thus they must all along
(so Socrates' remark implies) have been designing a city in which each
member's functioning subserves the good of all the others and (thereby) serves
the common good of the whole.

As far as I have been able to find, this princi

ple of contribution to a common good for the whole city has not in fact been
stated „explicitly before 420-421. (It is given subsequently, at 466A, and,
most importantly and adequately, at 519E-520A, when Plato argues that his
philosopher-king should return to the cave to rule - but not before 420-421.)
Nonetheless, it can fairly easily be seen to have been one of Plato's basic
constructive principles "from the very start."

For what already constitutes

his "minimal city" of 3698-D as in fact a "city" is the awareness, on the part
of each and every one of its members (all four or five of them!), that they
are associated with one another in it - each one "calling upon" or "making use
of" each other member's roles or skills (369C1-2) - for their mutual advan
tage: in that "minimal city,"
each one gives over to each other one (if he does give over anything
at all) or takes over from each other one, because each supposes
that to do so is better for himself. (369C6-7)
Plato's fundamental point here at the very start of his construction is that
each and every member's needs must be advanced by the working together of the
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"congregation" (synoikia). What makes their elementary city a "city" Is not
the mere diversity of the labor collected In It, but rather their sharing of
that labor In the shared awareness that so doing Is a means to every member's
satisfying his, and every other member's, fundamental needs. It is not as
though one needed, in order to constitute a city, merely to have different
forms of skill and labor gathered together in it - as though what made it a
"city" were the mere presence in it of a variety of functions.

What is essen

tial to the city, and indeed constitutive of it, is rather the reciprocal
inter-relatedness of these diverse functions.

The "minimal city" of 369B-D is

simply one in which this shared reciprocation is extremely obvious.

At the

same time, just because it is so very small and simple a city cr í?o1it¡cal
whole, it is perhaps at the same time not so obvious that th*s reciprocity, as
a means of achieving a common good for all concerned, is in fact operating as
a "constitutive principle" of its wholeness. (The unaided eye can take in
groups of four or five as wholes of some kind at a single glance!) Only as the
city becomes larger and more complex does this principle emerge into explicit
ness as a controlling factor in
at 420B. Socrates is perfectly
ple that he enunciates there as
along, for it has been, even if

its design and operation. That is what happens
justified, however, in speaking of the princi
the "same path" he has been following all
only implicitly, a controlling factor of his

construction "from the very beginning." By the same token, Plato is quite jus
tified when he claims later on (in the discovery passage at 432D-433A) that
the "service requirement" which we found incorporated in his definition of
political justice has been in front of the reader "all along - from the very
beginning" - even if it has until then "escaped them" (433 E2-3) that it was
there all along and was indeed functioning as part of the principle of jus
tice.
We shall soon see how scrupulously Plato follows out that principle or
"path" in his evolving construction of the city.

It seems well to pause first

to emphasize two implications of Plato's little-noticed reference (at 420B2)
to the path in question as "the same one."

For one, the reference should make

it clear - lest any reader be taken in by Socrates' "surprise" about the sud
den "turning up" of justice at 432B-E (as if the old man had actually simply
let his city "grow" and were peering at the final product, puzzled and yet
hopeful, wondering where within it justice might possibly be) - that his
entire account of the basic structure of the city was deliberately governed
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from the start by definite, although implicit, requirements - the very ones
that are to be "discovered" later as the content of justice. Second - and even
more important - it should make it clear that those requirements are not con
fined to his principle of one man-one job (and that one job "his own") but
also include the mutual adjustment of these jobs to one another to bring about
a shared resultant good.

That is, in terms of our earlier itemization of the

elements of his definition of justice, his principle of justice requires not
only (A) and (B) but also (C). Indeed, this last requirement is essential to
reading the Republic as an account of social or political justice at all.
Taken alone, the first two principles might conceivably be read as endorsing
some radically (even if ridiculously) apolitical or antipolitical program of
private personal self-fulfillment. On an adequately narrow view of each one
"doing his own," it might look like an invitation to an anarchic dispersal of
individual life careers, with everyone "doing his own t h i n g . W e would then
have individuals setting off in separate search of fulfillment - restricted,
let us grant, by the requirement that they not encroach, in seeking their own,
on anybody else's seeking Jns own, but still omitting the requirement that is,
on Plato's account, absolutely central to the political character of the
quest: that the search be made in concert with others, in and through the
institutions of the polis. That requirement is made explicit in the statement
of the principle of justice at 433A5-6; for as that statement makes clear, the
one thing of each man's "own" that justice stipulates that he "do" is his one
The very formula that Plato uses for his definition of justice
can refer to totally apolitical behavior. Thus at " . 370A4 it
means seeing to one's own needs all by oneself and
ther giving
help to others nor accepting it from them (see also note 4 below
on this passage). Again, at 496D6 (the philosopher crouching
behind a wall so as to keep a low profile) it means tending to
one's own affairs and ignoring everybody else's (06 ta hautou
pratton there contrasting with C8 ta ton poleon prattei). These
"isolationist" passages thus prove equivalent to each person's
"doing whatever he pleases," in contrast to serving the polis (cf.
520A3-4 and context). In all these cases, to be sure, context pro
vides essential help in bringing out the asocial, anti-political
reading of Plato's phrase. Nonetheless, the very possibility of
such uses of it helps remind us of the amount of elipsis that
Plato's formula involves, and the amount of expansion of it that
we may require in order to understand its force. (For further
discussion of Plato's use of ta hautou prattein# see also A.W.H.
Adkins, "Polupragmosune and 'Minding One's Own iBusiness'," Classi
cal Philology, 71 C l 9761, pp. 301 ,ff.)

T.

7
»

contribution to the social system that he lives in - his hen ton peri ten
polin.
To see how scrupulously Plato adheres to the Service principle, it will
be useful to make a rapid review of his construction of the city.

We have

worked backward from the discovery passage at 433-434, following its backward
references through 420B right to the beginning of Plato's exposition.

We shall

now move forward from that beginning to bring into relief the thoroughgoing
functional rationale of Plato's city.

By this means, the way may be prepared

for a clearer grasp of Plato's theory of social justice, and for a clearer
reading of the discovery passage.
Π
Though the bulk of Plato's lengthy exposition in II-IV is given over to
the selection and education of the Guardians, we can best expose the underly
ing structure of his theory by ignoring most of that and attempting to dis
close the structural rationale of the polis as a practical solution to a human
problem, locating in his account both the natural components that create the
problem (see column A.l of Figure I on the next page) and those that contri
bute to its solution (column B.l). Such an analysis shows Plato's view to be
that the polis is a kind of human contrivance - the practical solution for a
problem caused by certain features of our human nature and our natural
environment. It is a solution made possible by certain facts about human
nature, but, for all that, Plato's view falls far short - and very carefully
falls short - of saying simply that we are "by nature" political animals, or
2
that our nature "necessitates" that we should be so. As we shall see, the
various offices of his polis turn out to have both a "functional" and a
"natural" ground, and neither one stands alone, though a certain priority
attaches to the functional line of justification.

Books II-IV of the Republic

- despite their leisurely pace and wide-ranging subject matter, and despite
2. Plato's careful avoidance of "necessity"-talk is perhaps part
of his sotto voce rebuttal to Glaucon's opening speech, and in
particular to his view that life in a just society is chosen hos
anankaion all' oukh hos agathon (358C3-4). At the same time, his
strategy may also have been intended to avoid the sort of Sophis
tic employment of necessity-talk that one finds in the Anonymus
Iambiichi (cf. DK.II, 402.24-30, and A. T. Cole's discussion of
this tract, HSCP, 65 (1961), pp. 127-163).

Figura I» (cf· section II of papar)
B. SOLUTION

A. PROBLEM

(I)

1. Natural Basis
of Solution

As mortal and appear
animals, men
have many different
needs.

These needs must be
satisfied in order
for men to survive,
let alone flourish·

a) Different men
have different
talents;
b) different jobs
impose different
schedules;
c) labor takes
time and skill.

Men pool their talents
and labor by reciprocal
exchange of goods and
services in a context
of job specialization
(adopted for the sake
of efficiency, and
excellence of quality).

Once needs are satisfied, men have
wants (also based
in their appetitive
nature), and these
wants have no natu
ral limitations·

Pursuit of satis
faction for these
unlimited wants
leads to conflicts
and thus to war.

Men of spirit are
available to spe
cialize in the
business of war
(offensive and
defensive)

Set up a Guardian Glass
to function both (a) as
an army (vs. external
enemies) — for which
they must be fierce —
and (b) as a Police
force (against internal
enemies) — for which
they must be gentle.

To harmonize or
reconcile these
opposed traits with
in a stable character
structure, very care
ful education is.
needed.

Men of special
wisdom can super
vise such educa
tion and thus can
save the city
(412 A-B ).

Set up such men as
a ruling element
within the Guardian
Class. (Later on, but
not in Bks. II-IV, they
will turn out to be the
“
Philosopher-Kings.")

Natural Basis
•of Problem

î titive

(II)

2. Statement of
Solution

2» Statement of
Problem

1.

(III) Both fierceness and
gentleness are nee
ded in the Guardians
(see II.B.2), yet
these are opposed
characteristics.

n.b. This chart la so structured that reading each line from left to right
is meant to force one on to the next line (as solutions to one problem
generate another problem, and so on):
(A)
(I)
* (II) *
(III)

(B)

I.A ---- — —
II.A
^^III.A —

—

>

I.B— ^
TT

----III.B

« ,..

(■ Artisan Class)
(* Auxiliary Guardians)
(«· Ruling Guardians)

δ
the seemingly arbitrary way in which they take up the education of the Guardi
ans in such extensive detail - nonetheless pursue a highly systematic
rationale for the polis and achieve a very tight-knit functional coherence in
their account of the basic structure of offices or statuses in the polis. To
defend this view, I will briefly review Plato's genesis of the city.

These

matters are extremely familiar, of course, but my hope is that the structural
pattern to be exhibited here will make the exercise worthwhile.
(I.A) All humans have, by nature, a complex variety of needs for their
survival, needs especially for food, shelter and clothing. Nature provides no
automatic satisfactions for these needs (good caves are not so common,.cloth
ing does not grow on trees), and work is needed to insure that they are met,
(I.B) Since men have different sorts of aptitudes, physiques, and so on and
since different jobs require different kinds of skills and of labor and impose
different schedules of work, it seems much the most efficient way to satisfy
these needs for men to band together, each specializing at the service he is
best suited for and all participating in a mutual exchange of goods and ser
vices.

This is the most efficient solution (notice rhaon at 370A6 and C4),

though alternative, perhaps less efficient, ways might also be devised.
(II.A) But satisfying primary needs and securing survival inevitably
issues in a tendency toward luxury. Inevitably, because the appetitive part of
the soul - that same part whose maintenance is basic to our natural needs for
survival - knows no intrinsic limitedness; our pursuit of satisfaction for
these appetites proves inseparable from a tendency to excess, and thus, since
there is no limitless supply of such luxuries, nor of necessities, provided by
nature, it leads inevitably to encroachment on our neighbors' supplies of
goods: to grabbiness and pleonexia. This leads to conflicts with other commun
ities and creates the problem of war with them.

(II.B) Certain men, however,

like certain breeds of dog, are naturally well adapted for fighting, and these
men become the Guardians of the city. They are first introduced (373E,ff) for
externally directed functions - their aggressive and defensive roles toward
other communities - but because the same hankering after luxuries that leads
the citizens into conflicts with external neighbors also inclines them toward
conflict with each other, Plato gives his Guardians two functions: both their
external business and the internal function of policing the state. (III.A)
This complex role, however, requires a highly problematic blending of con
flicting attributes in the Guardians' character: they must be fierce toward
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enemies yet genuinely gentle to their fellow citizens, for they are to be a
part of the city, after all, "fellow citizens" of all the others, and not like
the savage watch dogs that some businesses turn loose to roam their grounds
and keep intruders out while those who work there are away. They need careful
training to develop a dependable blend of such opposing tendencies, and an
educational program of such difficulty and importance cannot be left to run
itself, but needs careful management. Fortunately (III.B), some of the Guardi
ans are especially able to lead the others and to direct the educational sys
tem which produces new Guardians.

These few must be established as the Masters

of the educational system and as rulers of the other Guardians (412A-E).

Their

good work is needed so that the other Guardians will do their work well, and
the latter must function well in order to achieve the basic aim of having any
polis at all, that of securing - of securely securing, we might say - the
3

joint satisfaction of the basic needs of all the citizens.
The columns of the schema in Figure I summarize the present account,
exhibiting both the tight-knit functional coherence of Plato's social system
and the essential distinction between "functional" and "natural" grounds for
the various offices encompassed in it. The pattern of this chart makes several
key points clear. Plato's polis is, on this account, a system in which alj_ the
offices are ultimately justified by showing how they work to secure the
members' basic needs (I.A).

That is to say, all the offices - the basic design

of the entire system - are governed by our earlier Service Requirement. No
appeal is made here to a "natural dominion" of Reason over Appetite, nor to
any privilege based on "natural superiority." The distributive impact of
differing natural aptitudes emerges only in our column B: that is, it is lim
ited throughout to the assigning of men to the role by which they may best
serve the interests of the whole.

(Our Fittedness Requirement - item [Bl in

Section I above - is governed throughout by item [C] there, the Service
Requirement.) The functional line of justification is thus the operative one
3. Eventually, as the long argument of the Republic unfolds, it
will turn out that these rulers of the Guardians are even more
different from the other citizens than had earlier appeared: they
are philosophers, no less, men and women with all the metaphysical
and psychological uniqueness that strange calling entails. Within
Books II-IV, however, the functional and natural justification for
their role is much more limited, and Plato's definition of politi
cal justice is, after all, drawn from his founding of the city in
Books II-IV.
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för offices - i.e., for the basic structure of the system - while natural
aptitude serves rather to justify the choice of individuals to fill each
office.

As a consequence, notice, and despite the fact that Plato very often

speaks of bestowing offices and honors in accordance with appropriate natural
endowments (e.g., 415C1-2 or 453E2), it would be quite mistaken to say he
holds that de facto differences in physis automatically, or of themselves,
establish social privileges de jure. On such a view (a fairly common view of
the Republie» I believe), the coexistence of the several classes of the city
seems a kind of automatic growth of nature: some sort of "preestablished har
mony" among a set of distinct class privileges somewhat on a par with the fact
that oil tends to rise above, and float upon, water, nature thus bringing
about a stratification which need not make any integrated, systematic sense,
but simply exists kata physin. Interpretations which thus treat of Plato's
city solely or primarily as a "natural growth" are, so to speak, one-sidedly
focused on the right-hand, (B) column of our schema.

Such approaches miss the

functional significance - the problem-solving sense - behind the interrelated
activities or functions of each sector, activities that serve to solve the
essential survival-problem facing a city and thus work together for the common
good of all its members.
A.

That is, they miss the relation of Column B to Column

But throughout Plato's account, the functional line of justification enjoys

a genuine priority: as the consecutive course of our "functional flow chart"
shows, the securing of all the members' basic needs remains the fundamental
principle of Plato's polis, from the start of its construction at 369B through
to its conclusion at 427C.
But it is not just any; system that can serve all its members in a manner
acceptable to them all.

Plato's formula for justice, as we shall now see, cov

ers precisely those features of the system - that set of fundamental or "foun
dational" constraints on the very design of the system - that are to insure
that the city will serve all of its members and will thereby be rationally
acceptable to them all.
Ill
When the discovery passage tells us that the definition of justice has
been before us "all along" (although not explicitly as a principle of "jus
tice"), we should be guided, I believe, to look at what Plato has done with
that principle in the course of his construction, in order to understand what
he takes his principle to mean. When we review Republic II-IV in that way, we

η
find, I shall argue, five distinguishable senses in which his elliptical for
mula for justice as "each one doing his own" has been built into the basic
fabric of the city. All five of these senses must be satisfied, he seems to be
saying, in order for the virtue of justice genuinely to characterize the com
pleted city.
Summarily stated, the five senses of the principle that Plato seems to
envision are these:
(1)

The Service Requirement on Individuals ("each one doing his
job" involves "everyone doing some job," and no one freeloading or benefiting from the labor of others without recipro
cating).
(2) The Service Requirement on Offices ("each one doing a job"
requires that there be socially relevant, contributory jobs for
each to do).
(3) The FitteHhess Requirement (each one doing his own job - the
job he is best fitted for and best fulfilled by)/
(4) The Openness Requirement ("each one doing his job" involves
each one getting to do his job: the system must be open enough
for individuals to attain the positions they are fitted for).
(5) Uniqueness Requirement ("each one doing his job" involves each
doing his own job and only his own job, not encroaching on any
other).I
I shall briefly take up each of these senses in turn.
(1)

The first aspect of the principle that "each one should do his job"

is as a Service Requirement applied to individual citizens. Plato's stipula
tion that each citizen do his own job no doubt focuses attention on each one's
doing specifically that job for which he is best suited.

More basically still,

however, what this aspect of the principle requires is that each one should do
something: that each must contribute, in some way or other, to the securing
of that common good for which the city basically exists. To capture this very
general, fundamental sense of Plato's principle, we might best imagine his
formula for justice converted into an inscription over the gates of his city,
one addressed to all who enter into it.

His formula, ta hautou prattein will

then become to son pratte ("Do what is yours

to do ," or the like).

Even this

inscription might, as we noted earlier be misinterpreted as apolitical or
purely individualistic. ("Do your own thing.") But Plato's intention is of
course quite the reverse. His motto-inscription would stand as an admonish
ment, reminding all who enter that they must do so in the awareness that jus
tice requires, as a condition of their receiving the benefits of the social
system within, that each be prepared to reciprocate by contributing toward the
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common good.

One can "enter" Plato's city only on the condition of reciprocity

with its other members; indeed, accepting that condition is constitutive of
each person's "entering" and becoming a member of, or citizen of, the city.
The Service Requirement as addressed to individuals is in essence the require
ment that every member realize that he jte a "member" - a contributing part of
an integrated, functioning whole: that he must "pull his own oar" or play his
part and not attempt to "free load" or exploit the labors of other members.
Perhaps to sum up this aspect of Plato's principle we might best translate our
gateway inscription in a slightly different manner: what it means is, "Do your
share."4
(2)

Closely connected to this first sense of the principle is another

form of the Service Requirement, this time applied to offices.

The principle

requires, in this second sense, that the political system can incorporate, and
thus legitimate, all and only such offices as conduce to the basic goal of its
very existence, the ongoing satisfaction of all its members' needs. (The
satisfaction of this principle will be presupposed by all others; for only
insofar as an office is itself politically justifiable can any individuals
justly be required to perform in it or to respect the work of others who may
do so. Any application of the Service Principle to individuals presupposes
that there are legitimate positions in which the individuals can be expected
to serve.) In this sense, the principle of "each one doing a job" proves
Here note particularly the language of sharing (koinon,
koinonein, etc.) at 369E2-370A4 and 520A1 (set in contrast to the
apolitical reading of ta hautou prattein that was mentioned in
note 1 above). This principle of sharing might also be expressed
as a principle of reciprocity among the members of the city and in
this connection Plato's use of the words metadidonai and allelous
takes on a special interest (see 369C6-7, 371B4-6, 372A1-2 and
especially 519E2-520A2). In this respect, at least, Plato's theory
in the Republic shows affinities with the Pythagorean approach to
justice as reciprocity within exchange relations that is discussed
by Aristotle in E.N., V.5 (and cf. Re£.
371ET2-372A2). That
chapter of Aristotle's Ethics has been well characterized as a
kind of "commentary" on Republic 369-371 (cf. M.I. Finley, "Aris
totle and Economic Analysis," Past and Present, 47 11970], pp. 125, quote at p. 14). Despite some affinities, however, Plato's ap
proach does not stress (as Aristotle does in V.5) the mathematization of exchange values. That is to say, Plato does
not
"Pythagoreanize" in his approach to the theory of justice. The
roots of his own theory lie, as I shall argue, in quite another
area of Greek philosophy.

T.
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equivalent to the principle of thoroughgoing functionality for the city.

Plato

conceives of the city precisely as a reciprocally interconnected set of
offices that are all justifiable as_ contributions to the purpose for which the
city exists (that of securing its citizens' needs), and the present sense of
his principle says that a just city is one that does thus serve its citizens'
needs - one which is made up of real jobs (efficacious social contributions,
lives of socially meaningful labor) for the citizens to do.
(3)

In its third sense, the principle of "each one doing his own" is our

earlier Fittedness Requirement: that each should play the role within the
polis for which his nature is suited.

Taken in this sense, the principle

serves not merely to state that the citizen should serve but to identify how
he ought to serve.

By virtue of this sense, Plato's principle has a certain

"self-realization" aspect: each citizen is to do what he is best fitted for
and will thus be playing the role through which his nature finds the greatest
fulfillment and he, the greatest happiness, that he is capable of attaining
(n.b. 421C4-6). However, such individualistic self-realization is of course
not fundamental to Plato's theory. The citizens' activities are politically
justified, not as self-realizations, but only as contributions to the welfare
of the whole.

Hence each one's self-realization can and must be limited on

every hand: the profit motive of the artisans is checked by imposing limits on
accumulations of private wealth; the Guardians' pugnacity and militarism, by a
prudently managed foreign policy; and even the Rulers' urge toward abstracted
contemplation must be checked (by "forcing" them back into the Cave). Each
part can get?ionly so much self-fulfillment as proves consistent with a maximal
comparable fulfillment for all other parts of the whole. But that much selffulfillment, each citizen does have a right to expect from the system, and
satisfying even this limited self-realization feature entails important con
straints on the city: it must not deny self-realization to any member by
"using" him against his nature or by denying him access to an available social
role for which his nature suits him.

At the same time, of course, this sense

of the principle can be read as a competence requirement: that each one should
have a role for which he is suited also means that only persons truly quali
fied for a role should in fact get to play it.

(Although the most obvious

examples would be Plato's ruling offices, the same holds for all of them: no
one physically enfeebled or susceptible to sun-stroke could justifiably be set
to plowing open fields

cf. 371C5-8;[371E].)

We can thus read the present
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sense of the principle in two directions: it states what individual members
can expect of their roles (that they offer to each such self-realization as he
can fairly expect within and through the system), and it states what the role
can expect of those assigned to play it (that they be competent for it by vir
tue of talent, training, and the like).
(4) Both aspects of the previous "Fittedness Requirement" entail still
another constraint on the system as a whole: that its offices must be open to
anyone qualified to perform them.

The requirement that the just city be one

with "everyone doing his own job" must, by the same token, be construed as one
in which everybody gets to do his own job - i.e., one where careers lie open
to talents within the system and where reliable procedures operate to identify
and develop Individual talents in a dependable way.

(The clearest case of

such openness in the Republic would no doubt be Plato's scheme for vertical
mobility, both into and out of, his governing class f415B-C]. The career
chances open to qualified women are still another example of the principle,
though one not mentioned until well after the definition of justice has been
arrived at.) This openness requirement is partly a functional imperative for
the city - the essential means to its providing qualified workers to man all
the necessary positions and so most efficiently to get the work of the city
done - but it also means that the city must hold forth a fair chance for all
its members to realize themselves as fully as they can within the system.
(5)

In its fifth and last sense, Plato's principle of justice as "each

one doing his own" is our earlier Uniqueness Requirement and stipulates that
each citizen do one and only one job in the city - the one he is by nature
suited for. For all its importance to the Republic, this sense of the princi
ple stands in a curious relation to the others.

It is very close in force to

our earlier Fittedness Requirement but is not its equivalent.

To generate (5)

(the requirement that each one do only one job) from (3) (the requirement that
each do a job he is suited for and thus can be fulfilled by doing), we must
import the empirical assumption that each citizen has such narrowly deter
minate natural endowments that he can function only in one way. That extrava
gant, if not preposterous, assumption would scarcely seem to merit considera
tion, and the real grounds for this sense of Plato's principle are not easy to
discern. Although specialization of labor was first introduced (at 369-372)
as a means of maximizing efficiency within the artisan class, later on (at
434A-C) it is more or less shrugged off as a rule for the organization of
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labor there and retained only for the "vertical" class distinctions between
artisans. Guardians, and Rulers (i.e., not within class I of our schema, but
only between classes I, II, and III).

That Plato should at least have enter

tained abandoning it seems appropriate: since it was introduced only as an
efficiency measure, it at least deserved consideration whether other measures
might prove more efficient, measures such as having the citizens maximize
their output by pursuing mastery in as many different areas as they success
fully can. When he shrugs off the principle quite so casually as he does, how
ever, it seems difficult to doubt that he does so for other reasons than the
alleged ones.

I am not concerned at present to identify those reasons -

whether they spring from Plato's strong conviction that possessing private
interests is necessarily Incompatible with attentiveness to public good, from
an anticipation of his later metaphysical distinction between philosophers and
other types of men,5 from a desire to preclude democracy as a political sysfi

tern, or from all of the above.

What I do wish to emphasize is that this last

sense of his principle goes beyond the earlier ones in significant respects.
Though it does in a sense grow out of them, it adds further assumptions and
should not be permitted to block the others from our view.

Thus for instance

it would be quite wrong to suppose that only this sense of Plato's principle
of justice underlies his argument against pleonexia. The Uniqueness Require
ment may well appear to capture, and to appropriate to itself, the case
against pleonexia, but it does so only in the very superficial sense that
"doing one's own - when understood as doing only one's own and nothing else
but that - must trivially, merely numerically, entail not encroaching on what
is anybody else's "own."

Plato tries to support.his definition of justice by

emphasizing this implication of not encroaching upon ta allotria (others'
See Gregory ATIéstos1 treatment of this theme in the context of
his analysis of Plato's view: "The Theory of Social Justice in the
Polis in Plato's Republic," in Helen F. North (ed.). Interpreta
tions of Plato, (Leiden, 1977), pp. 26-34 and passim.
W. ÄtHehian democracy, whatever else it was, at least involved
each citizen's doubling, or even tripling his social roles, being
active not only as a private person but in the military and in
politics. Pericles' "Funeral Oration" puts great stress on both
points about Athens: its "easygoing" attitude toward military du
ties (Thucydides, 11.39) - in sharp contrast to Spartan, or Pla
tonic, specialization and askesis - and then (II.40.2) its demand
that every citizen should be concerned both with ta politika and
with his private affairs.
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property or prerogatives) in his judicial example at 433E6-434A1, and by his
remarks about polypragmosyne at 433B7, ff (note especially 433D1-3), but in
fact the real ground barring pleonexia from his city is not the superficial
one expressed in the Uniqueness Requirement (founded as that is on the arbi
trary assumption that each person has some unique natural capacity) but the
deeper and better one given by our earlier Service Requirement: the fact that
the basis of the polis is the mutual pursuit of shared advantage and that this
project requires the reciprocity of action we saw enjoined by our gateway
inscription, a mutuality that would be disrupted by acts of pleonexia.^
IV
In the preceding sections we have tried to unpack the meaning of Plato's
formula for justice by interpreting it through what he actually does with it the various senses in which it guides his construction of the city "from the
very beginning." Justice turns out, on this approach, to be that feature (or
complex set of features) of the political system in virtue of which it can be
expected to deal fairly with al 1 who participate as members in it and will
thus be rationally acceptable to them all. Such an approach to the concept of
justice is very much in the spirit of contractarian theorists whohave
approached the analysis of justice in the context of imagined persons who, in
some "original position," are conceived of as contracting with one another to
P
initiate a political system.
But how, it may well be asked, can any such
approach apply to Plato's procedure in the Republic?

He does

not present his

The Tine of argument suggested here is essentially the Sophis
tic one against pleonexia. Cf. the argument against it from the
need for, and benefits of, eunomia in the Anonymus Iambiichi. Sec
tions 6 and 7 (D.K. II.402-404). A.T. Cole has noted and explored
the relations between Plato's procedure (here and elsewhere in the
Republic) and that of the Anonymus (HSCP, 65 Π9611 , pp. 145-149).
8. I have in mind, of course, especially John Rawls' work.
I
should make it clear, however, that I have no wish to compare
Plato's view with the detailed argument of Rawls' recent book.
Such comparisons with Rawls as I would make stay at the intuitive
level of his original 1958 article, "Justice as Fairness." That
article emphasized the idea that the institutions and practices of
a social system should be acceptable to a]JI_ of its members, being
understood by them as working to the advantage of every member in
it, and I believe that this idea guides Plato's construction in
the Republic.

T.
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analysis of justice through any contractarian story but in Socrates' solo
fabrication of a city in speech.

And far from displaying any sympathies with

the contractarian approach, Plato starts off Book II by having Glaucon set
forth a contractarian theory hand in hand with his attempt to defend the life
of injustice, and then has Socrates set about refuting that entire package.
Contractarian theory would seem part and parcel of what Plato is opposing in
the Republic, so it surely cannot be correct to suggest that his approach to
justice has significant affinities with the contractarian approach.
And yet I believe that is exactly what happens in the Republic and that
the explanation of this situation is not far to seek: what Plato is opposing
in Glaucon and Adeimantus, so far as their theory of justice is concerned, is
not their contractarianism but their conventionalism or positivism.

On the

account which they give in Republic II, societies are brought into existence
(for somewhat peculiar specific reasons we need not go into now; see 358E3359A2) and, once they have been established, the conventions they adopt and
the legislation that they enact define what is to count for them as "the law
ful and the just" (359A2-3). On this view, the content of a society's notion
of justice presupposes the established existence of that society and is a con
tingent derivative of its activities a£ a society. On Plato's analysis, how
ever, justice is not defined merely by some established city's decisions, but
is instead that feature (or set of features) of a social system that make it
rational for its participants to join together in accepting coexistence within
that system in the first place.

The concept of justice is thus not a deriva

tive, contingent result of some political association's activities but is
rather a necessary condition for the rational constituting of that associa
tion.9
Once this point has been grasped, it is plain that Glaucon does not
really advance a contractarian analysis of justice at all. His peculiar
employment of the contract myth proves little more than a rhetorical device
for setting forth a conventionalist, or positivist, view of justice.

His view

resolves into a starkly polarized nomos-physis contrast, with justice emerging
solely at the level of nomos, as the contingent result of men's associating
with one another on the ground of what we might call the frustration of their
Note Plato's pointat Rep. I.351C-352A, and A. T. Cole's dis
cussion of that passage's close relation to sophistic argumenta
tion ("Anonymus," pp. 160-161, n.43).
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Physis (ï.e., their alleged natural preference for domination of others).

On

Plato's view, however, justice belongs to the very physis of a polis: it is
the fundamental or constitutive attribute of the polis in the sense that only
insofar as justice characterizes the polis can it be a workable system - one
such that rational men may be willing and able to subscribe to it and thus to
constitute themselves as a "city" in and through its framework.

In short,

Glaucon actually uses the Social Contract device (or, rather, Plato has him
use it) quite against the genius of that philosophical theory.

He uses it as

a simplistic, conventionalist "reduction" of the force of considerations of
justice instead of using it as an "essentialist" defense of the absolute force
of those considerations.
Taking the present suggestion to its limits, we might even approach
Plato's Republic as a kind of contractarian theory in disguise. (An awfully
good disguise, I would concede, since certain features of the contractarian
approach prove incompatible with many aspects of Plato's political ideal, but
I emphasize that my present suggestion is restricted to the thesis about
Plato's analysis of the concept of justice.) Fantastic as this may at first
appear, it is not very difficult to bring the hidden contractarian myth in
Plato's own theory of justice into the open.

Consider again Plato's opening

remarks about the founding of a city. We are none of us self sufficient but
stand in need of many things, and that neediness of ours is the basic princi
ple for founding a city (369B5-7):
So, then, having these many needs, we gather many people into one
place of abode as associates and helpers - each of us calling in all
other members, this one for this service, that one for that - and to
this dwelling together we apply the name of a "polis" (369C1-4).
But each of us "calls in" the help of all the others how?

How else but by

reciprocating assurances that each of them may "call on" our help in return
for their help to us? What Plato sketches so briefly in 369C must surely be
envisaged as a social contract entered into by a group of rational egoists of
varying aptitudes and talents, each one pursuing his own self-interest through
participation in the polis - i.e., acting, as Plato himself remarks, "because
each supposes this Exchange] to be better for himself" (369C7).

As Plato's

construction of the city continues, justice emerges (as we have now seen) as
that set of constraints on the system of offices and roles within which these
men will live that is, in due course, understood to make the system a "rightly

f
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founded" one (427E7), one rationally acceptable to each and all of them as the
setting for, and the means for, the mutual satisfaction of their basic needs.
Thus Plato's own account of justice - noncontractarian and even anticontrac
tarian as it may appear - in point of fact establishes against Glaucon's socalled contractarian - but, in reality, merely conventional!Stic - thesis
about justice, a theory of justice surprisingly similar in inspiration to that
which later forms of contract theory have been used to justify!
To explore in depth what lies behind this strategy of Plato's would take
us too far beyond the scope of the present paper.

I myself believe, along with

Cole and Guthrie and others, that the Sophists had developed the pragmatic
contractarian approach to society that Plato relies upon here.

A hostile

reader of Plato might charge him with surreptitiously co-opting the insights
of the Sophistic approach while trying to pervert it into the service of an
archaic hierarchical and organicist social code.

More sympathetically, I

think, it could be said that Plato was convinced that when one tries to think
through the sophistic program of pragmatic social design, one has to recognize
the importance of considerations about the efficient division of labor and the
impact of facts about differing individual capacities upon the social enter
prise: i.e., one finds oneself driven, in the very course of following out the
Sophistic approach, to constructing the sort of successive "functional flow
chart" that we traced out in Section II above.

Whether he was right to believe

that the contractarian approach would lead one down that path - and if not,
just why he was not - is too large an issue to embark on here, so close to the
end of this mainly exegetical project. Again, whether or not one happens to be
sympathetic with the hidden strategy of Plato's use of contractarian social
theory, it might be noted that his larger purposes in the Republic rather
forced him to deal with the concept of justice in the way he did: he had to
" compress the extremely complex role(s) of justice into the enigmatic and mul
tiply ambiguous formula "each one doing his own" in order to project that for
mula forward for the sake of his subsequent analysis of psychic "justice" as
the healthy internal organization of the composite human soul.

It may have

been for such reasons of large-scale, lively, and even suspenseful literary
design, rather than out of any wish to conceal his surreptitious "borrowings"
from Sophistic theory, that Plato so artfully postpones until the discovery
passage his disclosure of the principle of justice that in fact has been in
action from the very beginning of his construction of the polis.
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Plato believed that he had clearly differentiated the concept of justice
from the concept of temperance (sophrosyne) through his long construction of
the city in Republic II-IV.

Many commentators have felt that, quite to the

contrary, the two remain virtually indistinguishable on his account of them.^
Since our present approach has made so much of the discrepancy between the way
that he "discovers" his definitions of justice and those of the other virtues,
it may also enable us to see more clearly what he took the difference between
the virtues of justice and temperance to be. The degree of success in dif
ferentiating these two seems an important test of the adequacy of any reading
of the Republic, and it may help to elucidate, as well as to defend, the
present reading if we consider that distinction here.
Temperance comes to be visible in the completed city, whereas, justice
stood before us from the very start. To grasp what Plato is conveying by that
contrast, let us first transpose his distinction to a nonpolitical context.
Consider a musical chorus - a standard four-part SATB group (Soprano, Alto,
Tenor, Bass), along with their expert conductor. What "temperance" would mean
for such a group would be the mutual adjustment of all five parts' performing
activities to one another. All four of the singing sections will agree in fol
lowing the conductor's lead and in seeking to blend their voices so as best to
produce a unified choral effect. (None of the individual singers seek to
"stand out" from the chorus, and no one section seeks to out-sing the others,
or to "run away with the beat," setting its own tempos or dynamics, unmindful
of the conductor's guidance.) And the conductor, for his part, conducts so as
to bring out the best performance of the music from his chorus (not so as to
focus audience attention on himself, or to "lord it" over the singers, or
whatever). When all the participants in the chorus blend their performing
skills in this way, they will be a "temperate" chorus, and their performances
will manifest this temperance and be "temperate" ones, too. - More precisely,
10. for recent discussion, and many references to earlier ac
counts, see C.J. Rowe, "Justice and Temperance in Republic IV," in
Glen W. Bowersock et al. (edd.), Arktouros: Hellenic studies
presented to Bernard M.W. Knox, (Berlin, New York, 1979), pp.
336-344. Rowe's own discussion, however, is restricted to indivi
dual or psychic justice, a matter we have not addressed at all in
the present paper. Even if we can succeed in defining a difference
between justice and temperance in the polis, the problem remains
of distinguishing between them in the individual.
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to be sure, the choral analogue of Platonic temperance would be all the
members' genuine conviction that their several performances should blend
together in the way described, that inner disposition of theirs to coordinate
their performances to produce a unified choral result. But these inner convic
tions are of course assumed to be efficacious ones: they are not mere hopes or
good intentions that are forgotten under the pressure of actual performance.
Therefore even though on Plato's account the chorus members' "virtue" of
temperance lies not in their actions but in the inner, psychic structure of
motivation and conviction that is manifested jin such actions, nonetheless this
virtue is one manifested precisely in and through performance.
And what of justice in our analogy? It will consist in the fact that all
participants in the chorus have the positions that they have for good and
proper reasons. For instance, the persons singing in the soprano section will
be those who are "by nature" sopranos (not, for instance, basses who are
forced to sing in falsetto or castrati made to order for the role), and simi
larly for the other sections: all will sing the parts their (vocal) nature
suits them for. And the conductor, too, must have his position and his author
ity within the chorus for the right reasons: not because he or his family have
been heavy backers of the chorus, but for such genuine musical abilities as
his knowledge and understanding of music, his ability to keep the beat and to
communicate it clearly to the chorus, to conduct rehearsals and prepare per
formances that bring out the best from his singers, and so forth.

When posi

tions within the chorus are so distributed that every member is "doing his
own" - each one contributing to the shared goal of performing beautiful music
in a beautiful way and doing so in the manner that he/she is truly best suited
for - then the chorus will be a "just" one. Whether the performances of the
chorus could be said to manifest that virtue of justice seems to me a prob
lematic question, and one that perhaps illuminates the discrepancy between the
discovery of justice and of the other virtues: The reason why justice is not
"visible" in the completed city - or perceptible in our chorus performances is not because it is not there at all to be perceived, but because it is
"there" in a different manner. The other virtues are precisely "performance
virtues," which manifest themselves in actions. But justice is a more abstract
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virtue, one that provides for the gathering together of the acting components
into a unified whole but is not itself perceptible as a component of perfor
mances. We might perhaps call it a "foundational" or "constitutional" as dis
tinct from a "performance" virtue.
With the help of this analogy, we can perhaps make clear the difference,
and the relation, between justice and temperance on Plato's theory. The virtue
of justice is presupposed by that of temperance; it is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for it. The virtue of justice consists, for the city, as
for our chorus, in the fact that every person in it is assigned the right role
for the right reasons, and that is what makes it rational and proper for each
person to be content with his role, dedicated to it in the stable conviction
that he should be doing what he does and the others, doing what they do. The
virtue of temperance consists merely in the members' having these convictions
and adjusting their actions or performances to one another so as to produce a
unified result. But justice is presupposed by it as the condition for their
having these convictions and thus acting dependably in this way, not as a
result of force or drugs or trickery but for good and proper reasons. Justice
is that virtue of the system that makes it rational and proper for each member
to accept his place within the system and to find fulfillment for himself (or
herself) in and through that place. It is the virtue that enables temperance
to "make sense" (as a reasonable virtue or way of life), and that is why it
has to be on the scene before the virtue of temperance can emerge into view.
Our analogy with a musical chorus may help to explain a part of Plato's
theory of the political virtues, but that is not to say that a chorus is a
good analogy for a polis, or that Plato's theory of the political virtues is
an adequate theory. One might say that just the reverse holds true - that the
disanalogies between a chorus and a city help to suggest what goes wrong with
Plato's theory. For instance, the members of a chorus may all be assumed to
enter into it voluntarily, antecedently committed to the specific goal of mak
ing music together and antecedently aware that their various individual musi
cal talents must mesh effectively with those of others for the sake of achiev
ing this end. Their natural musical endowments can fairly plausibly restrict
them to one of the familiar parts or roles within the chorus; it is extremely
difficult to sing both bass and soprano, and even more so to do both at the
same time. What is more, in the case of a chorus it can easily be assumed that
all the members who enter will antecedently, and quite nonproblematically, be
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aware what part within the chorus will be "theirs" to play: subtle distinc
tions (or large voice-changes) apart, people tend to know whether or not they
are basses, sopranos, or whatever.
features.

But a polis is lacking in all these

People do not enter into it voluntarily, nor for any limited,

antecedently agreed upon purposes, but exist within and through it as the locus
for the maintenance and very definition of their lives. This often involves
their choosing between competing goals or, perhaps, introducing new goals, and
given such indeterminacy about the actual goals of the group, it remains
unclear how any member could rationally accept his "natural endowments" as
justifiably determining his assignment or restriction to some specific role or
part within the city.

Even more fundamentally, it is totally unclear how any

one could realistically hope to discover what his determinate "natural endow
ments" are supposed to bie. I think these disanalogies between a chorus and a
polis could be developed (in less figurative language, of course^), and that
Plato's theory of justice would prove vulnerable to a line of criticism based
precisely on its violent departures from that very contractarian approach to
justice from which, as I have argued in this paper, his theory took its rise.
But that is a task for another occasion. My present concern has not been to
question whether Plato's theory was a good one or not, but only to advance
some suggestions as to what his theory was.
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ΤΠ The essential point is that the limited and antecedently
agreed upon purposes and clearly defined roles within a chorus all
make possible the nonproblematic satisfaction of the five com
ponents of justice cited in Section III above - both senses of the
Service Requirement, the Fittedness and Openness Requirements, and
even (perhaps especially) the Uniqueness Requirement. But things
are not nearly so clear in the complex, innovative and indeter
minate actualities of living in a polls.

